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1 Introduction
A cup of tea, left to its own, cools down while the surrounding air heats up
until both have reached the same temperature, and a gas, confined to the left
half of a room, uniformly spreads over the entire available space as soon as the
confining wall is removed. Thermodynamics (TD) characterises such process
in terms of an increase of thermodynamic entropy, which attains its maximum
value at equilibrium, and the Second Law of thermodynamics posits that in
an isolated system entropy cannot decrease. The aim of statistical mechanics
(SM) is to explain the behaviour of these systems, in particular its conformity
with the Second Law, in terms of the dynamical laws governing the individual
molecules of which they are made up. In what follows these laws are assumed
to be the ones of classical mechanics.
An influential suggestion of how this could be achieved was made by Lud-
wig Boltzmann (1877), and variants of it are currently regarded by many as
the most promising option among the plethora of approaches to SM. Al-
though these variants share a commitment to Boltzmann’s basic ideas, they
differ widely in how these ideas are implemented and used. These differ-
ences become most tangible when we look at how the different approaches
deal with probabilities. There are two fundamentally different ways of in-
troducing probabilities into SM, and even within these two groups there are
important disparities as regards both technical and interpretational issues.
The aim of this paper is to give a statement of these approaches and point
out wherein their difficulties lie.
2 Boltzmannian Statistical Mechanics
The state of a classical system of n particles with three degrees of freedom is
completely specified by a point x = (r1,p1, ..., rn,pn) in its 6n dimensional
phase space Γ, where ri and pi are position and momentum, respectively, of
the ith particle.1 For reasons that will become clear soon x, is referred to
as the system’s (fine-grained) micro-state. Γ is endowed with the ‘standard’
Lebesgue measure µ. Because we only consider systems in which the total
1For an introduction to classical mechanics see, for instance, Goldstein (1981) and Abra-
ham & Marsden (1980); Goldstein (2001), Goldstein and Lebowitz (2004), and Lebowitz
(1993a, 1993b, 1999) provide compact statements of the Boltzmannian approach to SM.
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energy is conserved and which have finite spatial extension, only a finite
region Γa ⊂ Γ is accessible to x.
The we now assume that dynamics of the system is governed by Hamil-
ton’s equations, which define a measure preserving flow φt on Γ: for all times
t, φt : Γ → Γ is a one-to-one mapping and µ(R) = µ(φt(R)) for all regions
R ⊆ Γ.2 To indicate that we consider the image of a point x under the dy-
namics of the system between two instants of time t1 and t2 (where t1 < t2)
I write ‘φt2−t1(x)’, and likewise for ‘φt2−t1(R)’. The inverse is denoted by
‘φt1−t2(x)’ and provides the system’s state at time t1 if its state was x at t2,
and likewise for ‘φt1−t2(R)’.
It is one of the central assumptions of Bolzmannian SM (BSM) that the
system’s macro-states Mi, i = 1, ...,m (and m < ∞) – characterised by the
values of macroscopic variables such as pressure, volume, and temperature
– supervene on the system’s macro-states, meaning that a change in the
macro-state must be accompanied by a change in the micro-state. Hence the
system’s micro-state uniquely determines the system’s macro-state in that to
every given x ∈ Γa there corresponds exactly one macro-state, M(x). This
determination relation is not one-to-one as many different x can correspond
to the same macro-state. It is therefore natural to define the macro-region of
Mi, ΓMi , as the subset of Γa that consists of all micro-states corresponding
to macro-state Mi:
ΓMi := {x ∈ Γa |Mi = M(x)}, i = 1, ...,m. (1)
The ΓMi together form a partition of Γa, meaning that they do not overlap
and jointly cover Γa: ΓMi ∩ ΓMj =  for all i 6= j and i, j = 1, ....m, and
ΓM1 ∪ ... ∪ ΓMm = Γa, where ‘∪’, ‘∩’ and ‘’ denote set theoretic union,
intersection and the empty set respectively.
The Boltzmann entropy of a macro-state M is defined as
S
B
(M) = k
B
log[µ(ΓM)], (2)
2In a Hamiltonian system energy E is conserved and hence the motion of the system is
confined to the 6n-1 dimensional energy hypersurface ΓE defined by the condition H(x) =
E, where H(x) is the Hamiltonian of the system. Restricting µ to ΓE yields a natural
measure µ
E
on this hypersurface. At some points in the argument below it would be more
appropriate to use µ
E
rather than µ. However, in the specific circumstances this would
need some explaining and as none of the conclusions I reach depend on this and I will not
belabour this point further.
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where M ranges over the Mi and kB is the so-called Boltzmann constant.
The macro state for which S
B
is maximal is the equilibrium state, meaning
that the system is in equilibrium if it has reached this state.3 For the sake of
notational convenience we denote the equilibrium state by Meq and choose,
without loss of generality, the labelling of the macro-states such that Mm =
Meq.
Given this, we can define the Boltzmann entropy of a system at time t as
the entropy of the system’s macro-state at t:
S
B
(t) := S
B
(Mt), (3)
where Mt is the system’s macro-state at time t; i.e. Mt := M(x(t)), where
x(t) is the system’s micro-state at t.
It is now common to accept the so-called Past Hypothesis, the postulate
that the system starts off at t0 in a low entropy macro-condition, the ‘past
state’ Mp (and we choose our labelling of macro-states such that M1 =Mp).
How the past state is understood depends one’s views on the scope of SM.
The grand majority of Boltzmannians take the system under investigation to
be the entire universe and hence interpret the past state as the state of the of
the universe just after the Big Bang (I come back to this below). Those who
stick to spirit of laboratory physics, regard laboratory systems as the relevant
unit of analysis and see the past state as a one that is brought about in some
particular experimental situation (such as the gas being confined to the left
half of the room). For the discussion in this paper it is inconsequential which
of these views is adopted.
The leading idea of BSM is that the behaviour of S
B
(t) should mirror
the behaviour of the thermodynamic entropy S
TD
; that is, it should increase
with time t and reach its maximum at equilibrium. We should not, however,
expect that this mirroring be exact. The Second Law of theormodynamics
is a unversal law and says that S
TD
can never decrease. A statistical theory
cannot explain such a law and we have to rest content if we explain the
‘Boltzmannian version’ of the Second Law (Callender 1999), also referred to
as ‘Boltzmann’s Law’ (BL):
3This assumption is problematic for two reasons. First, Lavis (2005) has argued that
associating equilibrium with one macro-state is problematic for different reasons. Second,
that the equilibrium state is the macro-state with the highest Boltzmann entropy is true
only for non-interacting systems like ideal gases. For a discussion of these points see Frigg
(2007a).
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Consider an arbitrary instant of time t′ and assume that at that
time the Boltzmann entropy S
B
(t′) of the system is low. It is then
highly probable that at any time t′′ > t′ we have S
B
(t′′) ≥ S
B
(t′).
A system that behaves in accordance with BL is said to exhibit ‘thermody-
namic like behaviour’ (TD-like behaviour, for short).
What notion of probability is invoked in BL and what reasons do we have
to believe that the claim it makes is true? Different approaches to BSM di-
verge in how they introduce probabilities into the theory and in how they
explain the tendency of S
B
(t) to increase. The most fundamental distinc-
tion is between approaches that assign probabilities directly to the system’s
macro-states, and approaches that assign probabilities to the system’s micro-
state being in a particular subsets of the macro-region corresponding to the
system’s current macro-state; for want of better terms I refer to these as
‘macro probabilities’ and ‘micro-probabilities’ respectively. I now present
these approaches one at a time and examine whether, and if so to what
extent, they succeed in explaining BL.
Before delving into the discussion, let me list those approaches to prob-
ability that can be discounted straight away within the context BSM, irre-
spective of how exactly probabilities are introduced into the theory. The first
three items on this list are the classical interpretation, the logical interpre-
tation and the so-called no-theory theory. These have not been put forward
as interpretations of Boltzmannian probabilities, and this for good reasons.
The first two simply are not the right kind of theories, while the no-theory
does not seem to offer a substantial alternative to either the propensity the-
ory or David Lewis’ view (Frigg and Hoefer 2007). Frequentism has never
been advocated as an interpretation of SM probabilities either because, as
von Mises himself pointed out, a sequence of results that is produced by the
same system does not satisfy the independence requirements of a collective
(van Lith 2001, 587). Finally, a propensity interpretation is ruled out by the
fact that the underlying micro theory, classical mechanics, is deterministic4
and that, Popper’s and Miller’s hand-waving notwithstanding, this is incom-
patible with there being propensities (Clark 2001).
4This is true of the systems studied in BSM; there are failures of determinism in classical
mechanics when we look at a larger class of systems (Earman 1986).
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3 The Macro-Probability Approach
In this section I discuss Boltzmann’s (1877) proposal to assign probabilities
to the system’s macro-states and Paul and Tatiana Ehrenfest’s (1912) view
that these should be interpreted as time averages, based on the assumption
that the system is ergodic.
3.1 Introducing Macro-Probabilities
Boltzmann’s way of introducing probabilities into SM is intimately related
to his construction of the macro-regions ΓMi , which is now also known as the
‘combinatorial argument’.5 Assume now that the system under investigation
is a gas that consists of nmolecules of the same type and is confined to a finite
volume V . Then consider the 6-dimensional phase-space of one gas molecule,
commonly referred to as µ-space. The conservation of the total energy of the
system and the fact that the gas is confined to V results in only a finite
part of the µ-space being accessible to the particle’s state. Now put a grid-
like partition on µ-space whose cells all have the size δω and whose borders
run in the directions of the momentum and position axes. This results in the
accessible region being partitioned into a finite number of cells ωi, i = 1, ..., k.
The state of the entire gas can be represented by n points in µ-space, every
one of which comes to lie within a particular cell ωi. An ‘arrangement’ is a
specification of which point lies in which cell; i.e. it is a list indicating, say,
that the state of molecule 1 lies in ω9, the state of molecule 2 lies in ω13,
and so on. A ‘distribution’ is a specification of how many points (no matter
which ones) are in each cell; i.e. it is a k-tuple (n1, ..., nk), expressing the fact
that n1 points are in cell ω1, and so on. It then follows that each distribution
is compatible with
W (n1, . . . , nk) :=
n!
n1! . . . nk!
(4)
arrangements. Boltzmann then regards the probability p(n1, ..., nk) of a dis-
tribution as determined by W (n1, . . . , nk):
‘The probability of this distribution is then given by the number
of permutations of which the elements of this distribution are
5For a presentation and discussion of this argument see Uffink (2007, 974-893).
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capable, that is by the number [W (n1, . . . , nk)]. As the most
probable distribution, i.e. as the one corresponding to thermal
equilibrium, we again regard that distribution for for which this
expression is maximal [...]’ (Bolzmann 1877, 187)6
In other words, Boltzmann’s posit is that p(n1, ..., nk) is proportional to
W (n1, . . . , nk).
Macro-states are determined by distributions because the values of a sys-
tem’s macroscopic variables are fixed by the distribution. That is, each
distribution corresponds to a macro state.7 To simplify notion, let us now
assume that all distributions are labelled with an index i and that there are
m of them. Then there corresponds a macro-state Mi to every distribution
Di, i = 1, ...,m. This is sensible also from a formal point of view because
each distribution corresponds to a particular region of Γ; regions correspond-
ing to different distribution do not overlap and all regions together cover the
accessible parts of Γ (as we expect it to be the case for macro-regions, see
Section 2). One can then show that the measure of each of each macro-region
thus determined is given by
µ(ΓMi) =W (n1, . . . , nk) (δω)
n, (5)
where Di = (n1, . . . , nk) is the distribution corresponding to Mi.
This allows us to restate Boltzmann’s postulate about probabilities in
terms of the measures of the macro-regions ΓMi :
The probability of the probability of macro-state Mi is given by
p(Mi) = c µ(ΓMi), i = 1, ....,m, (6)
6This and all subsequent quotes from Boltzmann are my own translations. Square
brackets indicate that Bolzmann’s notion has been replaced by the one used in this paper.
To be precise, in the passage here quoted ‘W ’ refers to distribution over a partitioning of
energy, not phase space. However, when Bolzmann discusses the partitioning of µ-space a
few pages further down (on p. 191) he refers the reader back to his earlier discussions that
occur on p. 187 (quoted) and p. 176. Hence he endorses the posits made in this quote
also for a partitioning of phase space.
7It my turn out that it is advantageous in certain situations to regard two or more
distributions as belonging to the same macro-state (e.g. if the relevant macro variables
turn out to have the same values for all of them). As this would not alter any of the
considerations to follow, I disregard this possibility henceforth.
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where c is a normalisation constant determined by the condition∑m
i=1 p(Mi) = 1.
I refer to this postulate as the ‘proportionality postulate’ and to proba-
bilities thus defined as ‘macro-probabilities’. The choice of the former label
is evident; the latter is motivated by the fact that the postulate assigns
probabilities to the macro-states of the system and that the value of these
probabilities are determined by the measure of the corresponding macro-
region. It is a consequence of this postulate that the equilibrium state is the
most likely state.
Boltzmann does not provide an interpretation of macro-probabilities and
we will return to this problem below. Let us first introduce his explana-
tion of TD-like behaviour. The leading idea of Boltzmann’s account of non-
equilibrium SM is to explain the approach to equilibrium by a tendency of the
system to evolve from an unlikely macro-state to a more likely macro-state
and finally to the most likely macro-state:
‘In most cases the initial state will be a very unlikely state. From
this state the system will steadily evolve towards more likely
states until it has finally reached the most likely state, i.e. the
state of thermal equilibrium.’ (1877, 165)
‘[...] the system of bodies always evolves from a more unlikely to
a more likely state.’ (1877, 166)
In brief, Boltzmann’s answer to the question of how SM explains the Second
Law is that it lies in the nature of a system to move from states of lower
towards states of higher probability.
3.2 Macro-Probabilities Scrutinised
The question now is where this tendency to move towards more probable
states comes from. It does not follow from the probabilities themselves. The
p(Mi) as defined by Equation (6) are unconditional probabilities, and as such
they do not imply anything about the succession of macro-states, let alone
that ones of low probability are followed by ones of higher probability. As an
example consider a loaded dice; the probability to get a ‘six’ is 0.25 and all
other numbers of spots have probability 0.15. Can we then infer that after,
9
say, a ‘three’ we have to get a ‘six’ because the six is the most likely event?
Of course not; in fact, we are much more likely not to get a ‘six’.
A further (yet related) problem is that BL makes a statement about a con-
ditional probability, namely the probability of the system’s macro-state at t′′,
M(t′′), being such that S
B
(t′′) > S
B
(t′), given that the system’s macro-state
at an earlier time t′ was such that its Boltzmann entropy was S
B
(t′). The
probabilities of the proportionality postulate are not of this kind. But maybe
this mismatch is only apparent because conditional probabilities can be ob-
tained from unconditional ones by using p(B|A) = p(B&A)/p(A), where A
and B are arbitrary events and p(A) > 0. The relevant probabilities then
would be p(Mj|Mi) = p(Mj &Mi)/p(Mi). Things are not that easy, unfortu-
nately. Mj and Mi are mutually exclusive (the system can only be either in
Mj orMi but not in both) and hence the numerator of this relation is always
zero.
The problem with this attempt is, of course, that it does not take time into
account. What we really would have to calculate are probabilities of the form
p(Mj at t
′′ & Mi at t′)/p(Mi at t′). The problem is that it is not clear how to
do this on the basis of the proportionality postulate as time does not appear in
this postulate at all. One way around this problem might be to slightly revise
the postulate by building time dependence into it: p(Mi at t) = c µ(ΓMi),
i = 1, ....,m. But even if this was justifiable, it would not fit the bill because
it remains silent about how to calculate p(Mj at t
′′ & Mi at t′). In sum, the
probabilities provided to us by the proportionality postulate are of no avail
in explaining BL.
This becomes also intuitively clear once we turn to the problem of in-
terpreting macro-probabilities. Boltzmann himself remains silent about this
question and the interpretation that has become the standard view goes back
to the Ehrenfests (1912). They suggest to interpret the p(Mi) as time av-
erages, i.e. as the fraction of time that the system spends in ΓMi .
8 The
equilibrium state, then, is the most probable state in the sense that the sys-
tem is most of time in equilibrium. Two things are worth noticing about this
interpretation. First, it makes it intuitively clear why macro-probabilities
cannot explain TD-like behaviour: from the fact that the system spends a
8Although time averages are, loosely speaking, the ‘continuum version’ of frequencies,
there are considerable differences between the two interpretations. For a discussion of this
point see von Plato (1988, 262-65; 1989 434-37).
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certain fraction of time in some macro-stateMi, nothing follows about which
state the system assumes after leavingMi – time averages simply have no im-
plications for the succession of states. Second, this interpretation needs to be
justified by a particular dynamical explanation; whether the time the system
spends in a macro-state is proportional to the volume of the corresponding
macro-region, depends on the dynamics of the system.
Of what kind does that dynamics have to be for a time average inter-
pretation to be possible? Again, Boltzmann himself remains silent about
the dynamical conditions necessary to backup his take on probability.9 The
Ehrenfests (1912) fill this gap by attributing to him the view that the system
has to be ergodic. Roughly speaking, a system is ergodic on Γa if for almost
all trajectories, the fraction of time a trajectory spends in a region R ⊆ Γa
equals the fraction of the area of Γa that is occupied by R.
10 If the system
is ergodic, it follows that the time that its actual micro-state spends in each
ΓMi is proportional to µ(ΓMi), which is what we need.
This proposal suffers from various technical difficulties having to do with
the mathematical facts of ergodic theory. These problems are now widely
known and need not be repeated here.11 What needs to be noted here is
that even if all these problems could be overcome, we still would not have
explained BL because macro-probabilities, no matter now we interpret them,
are simply the wrong probabilities to explain TD-like behaviour.
Or would we? When justifying the time average interpretation we intro-
duced the assumption that the system is ergodic. Ergodicity implies that a
system that starts off in the past state sooner or later reaches equilibrium and
stays in equilibrium most of the time. Isn’t that enough to rationalise BL? No
it isn’t. What needs to be shown is not only that the system sooner or later
reaches equilibrium, but also that this approach to equilibrium is such that
the whenever the system’s macro-state changes the entropy is overwhelm-
ingly likely to increase. To date, no one succeeded in showing that anything
of that kind follows from ergodicity (or as Jos Uffink (2007, 981) puts the
point, no proof of a statistical H-theorem on the basis of the ergodic hy-
9And, as Uffink (2007, 981) points out, he reaffirmed later in 1881 that in he did not
wish to commit to any dynamical condition in his 1877 paper.
10For a rigorous introduction to ergodic theory see Arnold and Avez (1968), and for an
account of its long and tangled history Sklar (1993, Chs. 2 and 5) and von Plato (1994,
Ch. 3).
11See Sklar (1993, Ch. 5), Earman and Re´dei (1996) and van Lith (2001) for discussions.
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pothesis has been given yet). And there are doubts whether such a proof is
possible. Ergodicity is compatible with a wide range of different dynamical
laws and it is in principle conceivable that there is a dynamical law that is
such that the system passes trough different macro-states in an way that is
non TD-like, for instance in that the Bolzmann entropy goes down as often
as it goes up (this is in principle compatible with an approach to equilibrium
because the steps downwards can be smaller than the steps upwards). To
rule this out (and thereby justify BL on the basis of the ergodic hypothesis),
one would have to show that the macro-state structure defined by the com-
binatorial argument is such that there exists no ergodic system that passes
these macro-states in non TD-like way. It seems unlikely that there is an
argument for this conclusion.
Even though ergodicity itself does not fit the bill, an important lesson
can be learned from these considerations, namely that key to understanding
the approach to equilibrium lies in dynamical considerations. Assume for a
minute that ergodicity was successful in justifying TD-like behavour. Then,
the the explanation of TD-like behaviour would be entirely in terms of the
dynamical properties of the system and the structure of the macro-regions;
it would be an account of why, given ergodicity, the system visits the macro-
states in the ‘right’ (i.e. TD-like) order. The proportionality principle and
the probabilities it introduces would play no role in this; an explanation of
the system’s behaviour could be given without mentioning probabilities once.
Of course, ergodicity is not the right condition, but the same would be the
case for any dynamical condition. What does the explaining is an appeal
to features of the system’s phase flow in relation to the partitioning of the
phase space into macro-regions ΓMi ; probabilities have simply become an idle
wheel.
There are two reactions to this. The first is give up the proportionality
principle and introduce probabilities in a different way; I discuss a way to
do this in the next section. The second is to endorse this conclusion and
to explain TD-like behaviour without appeal to probabilities. The typicality
programme (associated, among others, with Goldstein (2001) and Zangh`ı
(2005)) can be seen as doing exactly this. For a lack space I cannot discuss
this programme further here and refer the reader to Frigg (2007b).
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4 The Micro-Probability Approach
David Albert (2000) proposed a different approach to probabilities in BSM.
In this section I discuss this approach and Barry Loewer’s suggestion (2001,
2004) to understand these probabilities as Humean chances in David Lewis’
(1994, 1986) sense.
4.1 Introducing Micro-Probabilities
We now assign probabilities not to the system’s macro-states, but to measur-
able subsets of the macro-region corresponding to the system’s macro-state
at time t. For lack of a better term I refer to these probabilities as ‘micro-
probabilities’. An obvious way of introducing micro-probabilities is the the
so-called ‘Statistical Postulate’ (SP):
Let Mt be the system’s macro-state at time t. Then the proba-
bility at time t that the system’s micro-state lies in A ⊆ ΓMt is
pt(A) = µ(A)/µ(ΓMt).
Given this, we can now calculate the probabilities occurring in BL. Let Γ
(+)
Mt′
be the subset ΓMt′ consisting of all micro-states x that between t
′ and t′′
evolved, under the dynamics of the system, into macro-regions corresponding
to macro-states of higher entropy: Γ
(+)
Mt′
:= {x ∈Mt′ | φt′′−t′(x) ∈ Γ+}, where
Γ+ :=
⋃
Mi ∈M+ ΓMi and M+ := {Mi | SB(Mi) ≥ SB(Mt′), i = 1, ...,m}. The
probability that S
B
(t′′) ≥ S
B
(t′) then is equal to pt′(Γ
(+)
Mt′
) = µ(Γ
(+)
Mt′
)/µ(ΓMt′ ).
For Boltzmann’s law to be true the condition that µ(Γ
(+)
Mt )/µ(ΓMt) ≥
1− ε, where ε is small positive real number, must hold for all macro-states.
Whether or not this is the case in a particular system is a substantial ques-
tion, which depends on the system’s dynamics. However, even if it is, there
is a problem. It follows from the time reversal invariance of Hamilton’s equa-
tions of motion that if it is true that the system is overwhelmingly likely to
evolve towards a macro-state of higher entropy in the future, it is also over-
whelmingly likely to have evolved into the current macro-state from a past
macro-state M ′′ which also has higher entropy.12
12A point to this effect was first made by the Ehrenfest and Ehrenfest (1907; 1912,
32-34). However, their argument is based on an explicitly probabilistic model and so its
relevance to deterministic dynamical system is tenuous.
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Albert (2000, 71-96) discusses this problem at length and suggests fixing
it by first taking the system under investigation to be the entire universe and
then adopting the so-called Past Hypothesis (PH), the postulate that
‘[...] the world came into being in whatever particular low-entropy
highly condensed big-bang sort of macrocondition it is that the
normal inferential procedures of cosmology will eventually present
to us.’ (Albert 2000, 96).
This postulate is not without problems (see Winsberg (2004b) and Earman
(2006) for discussions), and those who accept it disagree about its status in
the theory (see Callender’s and Price’s contributions to Hitchcock (2004),
which present opposite views). I assume that these issues can be resolved in
one way or another and presuppose PH in what follows. The problem with
wrong retrodictions can then be solved, so Albert suggests, by conditionalis-
ing on PH:
‘[...] the probability distribution that one ought to plug into the
equations of motion in order to make inferences about the world
is the one that’s uniform, on the standard measure, over those
regions of the phase space of the world which are compatible both
with whatever it is that we may happen to know about the present
physical condition of the universe (just as the original postulate
[SP]) and with the hypothesis that the original macrocondition
of the universe was the one associated with the big bang.’ (Albert
2000, 95-96)
From a technical point of view, this amounts to replacing SP with what I
call the ‘Past Hypothesis Statistical Postulate’ (PHSP):
Let Mt be the system’s macro-state at time t. SP is valid for the
Past State Mp, which obtains at time t0. For all times t > t0 the
probability at time t that the system’s micro-state lies in A is
pt(A|Rt) = µ(A ∩Rt)
µ(Rt)
(7)
where Rt :=Mt ∩ φt−t0(Mp).
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Again, whether or not BL is true given this postulate is a substantive question
having to do both with the construction of the macro-states as well as the
dynamics of the system; I will come back to this issue below. Let us first
turn to the question of how these probabilities can be interpreted.
4.2 Humean Chance
The basis for Lewis’ theory of probability is the so-called Humean mosaic, the
collection of all non-modal and non-probabilistic actual events making up the
world’s entire history (from the very beginning to the very end) and upon
which all other facts supervene. Lewis himself suggested that the mosaic
consists of space-time points plus local field quantities representing material
stuff. In a classical mechanical system the Humean mosaic simply consist
of the trajectory of the system’s micro-state in phase space, on which the
system’s macro-states supervene.
The next element of Lewis’ theory is a thought experiment. To make this
explicit – more explicit than it is in Lewis’ own presentation – I introduce a
fictitious creature, Lewis’ Demon. In contrast to human beings who can only
know a small part of the Humean mosaic, Lewis’ Demon knows the entire
mosaic. The demon now formulates various deductive systems which make
true assertions about what is the case, and, perhaps, also about what the
probability for certain events are. Then the demon is asked to choose the
best among these systems. The laws of nature are the true theorems of this
system and the chances for certain events to occur are what the probabilistic
laws of the best system say they are (Lewis 1994, 480). Following Loewer
(2004), I call probabilities thus defined L-chances.
The best system is the one that strikes the best balance between strength,
simplicity and fit. The notions of strength and simplicity are given to the
demon and are taken for granted in this context, but the notion of fit needs
explicit definition. Every system assigns probabilities to certain courses of
history, among them the actual course; the fit of the system is measured by
the probability that it assigns to the actual course of history, i.e. by how
likely it regards the things to happen that actually do happen. By definition
systems that do not involve probabilistic laws have perfect fit. As an illus-
tration, consider a Humean mosaic that consists of just ten outcomes of a
coin flip: HHTHTTHHTT. Theory T1 posits that all events are independent
and sets p(H) = p(T ) = 0.5; theory T2 shares the independence assumption
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but posits p(H) = 0.9 and p(T ) = 0.1. It follows that T1 has better fit than
T2 because (0.5)
10 > (0.1)5(0.9)5.
Loewer’s suggestion is that BSM as introduced above – the package of
classical mechanics, PH and PHSP – is a putative best system of the sort just
described and that PHSP probabilities can therefore be regarded as Humean
chances:
‘Recall that (in Albert’s formulation) the fundamental postulates
of statistical mechanics are fundamental dynamical laws (New-
tonian in the case of classical statistical mechanics), a postulate
that the initial condition was one of low entropy, and the postu-
late that the probability distribution at the origin of the universe
is the microcanonical distribution conditional on the low entropy
condition. The idea then is that this package is a putative Best
System of our world. The contingent generalisations it entail are
laws and the chance statements it entails give the chances. It is
simple and enormously informative. In particular, it entails prob-
abilistic versions of all the principles of thermodynamics. That it
qualifies as a best system for a world like ours is very plausible.
By being part of the Best System the probability distribution
earns its status as a law and is thus able to confer lawfulness on
those generalisations that it (together with the dynamical laws)
entails.’ (Loewer 2001, 618; cf. 2004, 1124)
There is an obvious problem with this view, namely that it assigns non-
trivial probabilities (i.e. ones that can have values other than 0 and 1)
to events within a deterministic framework, which Lewis himself thought
was impossible (1986, 118). Loewer claims that Lewis was wrong on this
and suggests that introducing probabilities via initial conditions solves the
problem of reconciling determinism and chance:
‘[...] while there are chances different from 0 and 1 for possi-
ble initial conditions the chances of any event A after the initial
time will be either 1 or 0 since A’s occurrence or non-occurrence
will be entailed by the initial state and the deterministic laws.
However, we can define a kind of dynamical chance which I call
‘macroscopic chance’. The macroscopic chance at t of event A
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is the probability given by starting with the micro-canonical dis-
tribution over the initial conditions and then conditionalising on
the entire macroscopic history of the world (including the low
entropy postulate) up until t. [...] this probability distribution is
completely compatible with deterministic laws since it concerns
only the initial conditions of the universe.’ (Loewer 2001, 618-19;
cf. 2004, 1124)
Loewer does not tell us what exactly he means by ‘a kind of dynamical
chance’, in what sense this chance is macroscopic, how its values are cal-
culated, and how it connects to the technical apparatus of SM. I will now
present how I think this proposal is best understood and show that, on this
reading, Loewer’s ‘macroscopic chances’ coincide with PHSP as formulated
above.
As above, I take the system’s state at t > t0 to be the macro-stateMt. We
now need to determine the probability of the event ‘being in set A ⊆ ΓMt at
time t’. As I understand it, Loewer’s proposal falls into two parts. The first
is that the probability of an event at a time t is ‘completely determined’ by
the probability of the corresponding event at time t0; that is, the probability
of the event ‘being in set A at time t’, pt(A), is equal to the probability of
‘being in set A0 at time t0’ where A0 is, by definition, the set that evolves
into A under the dynamics of the system after time t has elapsed. Formally,
pt(A) = µ0(A0) = µ0(φt0−t(A)), where µ0 is the microcanonical distributino
over the Past State, i.e. µ0( · ) = µ( · ∩ ΓMp)/µ(ΓMp)
The second part is ‘conditionalising on the entire macrosccopic history
of the world [...] up to time t’. Loewer does not define what he means by
‘macroscopic history’, but it seems natural to take a macro-history to be a
specification of the system’s macro-state at every instant of time between
t0 and t. A possible macro-history, for instance, would be that system is
in macro-state M1 during the interval [t0, t1], in M5 during (t1, t2], in M7
during (t2, t3], etc., where t1 < t2 < t3 < ... are the instants of time at which
the system changes from one macro-state into another. What we are now
expected to calculate is the probability of ‘being in set A at time t’ given the
system’s macro-history. Let Qt be the set of all micro-states in ΓMt that are
compatible with the entire past history of the system; i.e. it is the set of all
x ∈ ΓMt that lie on trajectories that for every t were in the ΓMk corresponding
to the actual macro-state of the system at t. The sought-after conditional
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probability then is pt(A|Qt) = pt(A&Qt)/pt(Qt), provided that pt(Qt) 6= 0,
which, as we shall see, is the problematic condition.
Putting these two parts together we obtain the fundamental rule introduc-
ing L-chances for deterministic systems, which I call the L-chance statistical
postulate (LSP):
Let Mt be the system’s macro-state at time t. SP is valid for
the Past State Mp, which obtains at t0. For all times t > t0 the
probability that the system’s micro-state lies in A is
pt(A|Qt) = µ0(φt0−t(A ∩Qt))
µ0(φt0−t(Qt))
, (8)
where Qt is the subset of Mt of micro-states compatible with
the entire past history of the system and, again, µ0( · ) = µ( · ∩
ΓMp)/µ(ΓMp).
The crucial thing to realise now is that due to the conservation of the
Liouville measure the expression for the conditional probability in PHSP can
be expressed as pt(A|Rt) = µ(φt0−t(A ∩Rt))/µ(φt0−t(Rt)). Trivially, we can
substitute µ0 for µ in this expression which makes it is formally equivalent
to Equation 8. Hence PHSP can be interpreted as attributing probabilities
to events at t > t0 solely on the basis of the microcanonical measure over the
initial conditions, which is what Loewer needs.
However, the equivalence of PHSP and LSP is only formal because there
is an important difference between Qt and Rt: Rt only involves a condition-
alisation on PH, while Qt contains the entire past history. This difference
will be important below.
4.3 Problems with Fit
Loewer claims that BSM as introduced above is the system that strikes the
best balance between simplicity, strength and fit. Trivially, this implies that
it can be ranked along these three dimensions. Simplicity and strength are
no more problematic in SM than they are in any other context and I shall
therefore not discuss them further here. The problematic concept is fit.
The fit of a theory is measured in terms of the probability it assigns
to the actual course of history. But what history? Given that L-chances
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are calculated using the Lebesgue measure, which assigns measure zero to
any trajectory, they do not lead to a non-trivial ranking of micro histories
(trajectories in Γ). The right choice seems to be to judge the fit of theory
with respect to the system’s macro-history.
What is the probability of a macro-history? A first answer to this question
would be to simply use Equation (8) to calculate the probability of a macro
state at each instant of time and then multiply them all, just as we did in
the above example with the coins (with the only difference the probabilities
are now not independent any more, which is accounted for in Equation 8).
Of course, this is plain nonsense. There is an uncountable infinity of such
probabilities and multiplying an uncountable infinity of numbers is an ill-
defined operation. Determining the probability of a history by multiplying
probabilities for the individual events in the history works fine as long as the
events are discrete (like coin flips) but if fails when we have a continuum.
Maybe this was too crude a stab at the problem and when taking the
right sorts of limits things work out fine. Let us discretise time by dividing
the real axis into small intervals of length δ, then calculate the probabilities
at the instants t0, t0+δ, t0+2δ etc., multiply them (there are only countably
many now), and then take the limit δ → 0. This would work if the pt(A|Qt)
depended in a way on δ that would assure that the limit exists. This is not
the case. And, surprisingly, the problem does not lie with the limit. It turns
out that for all t > t1 (i.e. after the first change of macro-state), the pt(A|Qt)
do not exist because Qt has measure zero, and this irrespective of δ. This can
be seen as follows. Take the above example of a macro-history and consider
an instant t ∈ (t1, t2] when the system is in macro-state M5. To calculate
the probability of the system being in M5 at t we need to determine Qt, the
set of all micro-states in ΓM5 compatible with the past macro history. Now,
these points must be such that they were were in M1 at t1 and in M5 just
an instant later (i.e. for any ε > 0, at t1 + ε the system’s state is in ΓM5).
The mechanical systems we are considering have global solutions (or at least
solutions for the entire interval [t0, tf ], where tf is the time when the system
ceases to exist) and trajectories in such systems have finite phase velocity;
that is, a phase point x in Γ cannot cross a finite distance in no time. From
this it follows that the only points that satisfy the condition of being inM1 at
t1 and in M5 just instant later are the ones that lie exactly on the boundary
between M1 and M5. But the boundary of a 6n dimensional region is 6n− 1
dimensional and has measure zero. Therefore Qt has measure zero for all
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t > t1, and accordingly pt(A|Qt) does not exist for t > t1, no matter what
A. Needless to say, this renders the limit δ → 0 obsolete.
The source of these difficulties seems to be Loewer’s requirement that we
conditionalise on the entire macro-history of the system. This suggests that
the problem can be solved simply by reverting back to Albert’s algorithm,
which involves only conditionalising on PH. Unfortunately the hope that this
would make the problems go away is in vein. First, Loewer seems to be right
that we need to conditionalise on the entire macro-history when calculating
the fit of a system. Fit is defined as the probability that the system attributes
to the entire course of actual history and hence the probability of an event
at time t must take the past into account. It can turn out to be the case
that the evolution of a system is such that this probability of an event at t is
independent of (large parts of the) past of the system, in which case we need
not take the the past into account. But if certain conditional probabilities
do not exist given the system’s past, we cannot simply ‘solve’ the problem
by ignoring it.
Second, even if one could somehow convincingly argue that conditionalis-
ing on the entire past is indeed the wrong thing to do, this would not be the
end of the difficulties because another technical problem arises, this time hav-
ing to do with the limit. As above, let us discretise time by dividing the real
axis into small intervals of length δ and calculate the relevant probabilities at
the instants t0, t0 + δ, t0 + 2δ etc. The relevant probabilities are of the form
p(t′, t′′) := p(Mj at t′′|Mi at t′&Mp at t0), where t′ and t′′ are two consecu-
tive instances on the discrete time axis (i.e. t′′ > t′ and t′′ − t′ = δ), and Mi
and Mj are the system’s macro-states at t
′ and t′′ respectively. Calculating
these probabilities using PHSP we find:
p(t′, t′′) =
µ[φt′−t′′(ΓMj) ∩ ΓMi ∩ φt′−t0(ΓMp)]
µ[ΓMi ∩ φt′−t0(ΓMp)]
. (9)
These probabilities exist and we then obtain the probability of the actual
course of history by plugging in the correct Mi’s and multiply all of them.
The next step is to take the limit δ → 0, and this is where things go wrong.
We need to distinguish two cases. First, the system is in the same macro-
state at t′ and t′′ (i.e. Mi = Mj). In this case it limδ→0 p(t′, t′′) = 1 because
limδ→0 φt′−t′′(ΓMi) = ΓMi . Second, the system is in two different macro-states
at t′ and t′′. In this case limδ→0 p(t′, t′′) = 0 because limδ→0 φt′−t′′(ΓMj) =
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ΓMj and, by definition, ΓMj ∩ ΓMi = . Hence the product of all these
probabilities always comes out zero in the limit, and this for any phase flow
φ and for any macro-history that involves at least one change of macro-state
(i.e. for any macro history in which the system ever assumes a state other
than the past state). Fit, calculated in this way, fails to put different systems
into a non-trivial fit ordering and is therefore useless.
The moral to draw from this is that we should not take the limit and
calculate fit with respect to a finite number of instants of time; that is, we
should calculate fit with respect to a discrete macro history (DMH) rather
than a continuous one. By a DMH I mean a specification for a finite number
of instants of time t0 =: τ0 ≤ τ1 ≤ ... ≤ τj−1 ≤ τj := tf (which can but
need not be equidistant as the ones we considered above) of the system’s
macro-state at these instants: Mp at τ0, Mτ1 at τ1, Mτ2 at τ2, ..., Mτj at τj−1
and Mτj at τj, where the Mτi the system’s macro state at time τi.
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Before discussing the consequences of this move further, let me point out
that once we go for this option, the seeming advantage of conditionalising
only on PH rather than the past history evaporates. If we only consider,
the system’s macro-states at discrete times, Qt no longer needs to have mea-
sure zero. As a result, the probabilities introduced in Equation (8) are well
defined. So, conditinalising on the entire past is no problem as long as the
relevant history is discrete.
How could we justify the use of a discrete rather than a continuous macro-
history? We are forced into conditionalising over a continuum of events by
the conjunction of three elements: (1) the posit that time is continuous, (2)
the assumption that the transition from one macro-state to another one takes
place at a precise instant, (3) the posit that fit has to be determined with
respect to the entire macro-history of the system. We have to give up at
least one of these to justify the use of a discrete rather than a continuous
macro-history. The problem is that all three elements either seem reasonable
or are deeply entrenched in the theory and cannot be renounced without
far-reaching consequences.
The first option, discretising time, would solve the problem because if we
assume that time is discrete the macro-history is discrete too. The problem
with this suggestion is that it is ad hoc (because time in classical mechanics is
13I assume j to be finite. There is a further problem with infinite sequences (Elga 2004).
The difficulties I discuss in this section and the next are independent of that problem.
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continuous), and therefore defeats the purpose of SM. If we believe that clas-
sical mechanics is the fundamental theory governing the micro constituents
of the universe and set out to explain the behaviour of the universe in terms
of its laws, not much seems to be gained if such an explanation can only be
had at the expense of profoundly modifying these laws.
The second suggestion would be to allow for finite transition times be-
tween macro-states, i.e. allowing for there to be periods during which it is in-
determinate in which macro-state the system is. Given that states move with
finite phase velocity, this would amount to introducing ‘transition zones’, i.e.
‘belts’ between different ΓMk consisting of micro-states which neither be-
long to one nor the other macro-state. This suggestion is not without merit
as one could argue that sharp boundaries between macro-states are indeed
a mathematical idealisation that is ultimately unjustifiable from a physics
perspective. However, giving up the assumption that the ΓMk have sharp
boundaries and together form a partition of ΓE would amount to a serious
change in SM itself, and it would remain to be seen whether a theory based
on this assumption turns out to be workable.
The third option denies that we should conditionalise on the complete
macro-history. The idea is that even though time at bottom is continuous,
the macro-history takes record of he system’s macro-state only at discrete
instants and is oblivious about what happens between these. This is at once
the most feasible and the most problematic suggestion. It is feasible because
it does not require revisions in the structure of the theory. It is problematic
because we have given up the notion that the fit of a theory has to be best
with respect to the complete history of the world, and replaced it with the
weaker requirement that fit be best for a partial history.14 From the point of
view of Lewis’ theory this seems unmotivated. Fit, like truth, is a semantic
concept characterising the relation between the theory and the world, and if
the Humean mosaic has continuous events in it there should still be a matter
of fact about what the fit of the theory is.
Moreover, even if one is willing to believe that a discrete version of fit is
satisfactory, it is not clear whether this leads to useful results. Depending
on which particular instants of time one chooses to measure fit, one can get
14And mind you, the point is not that the fit of the full history is in practice too
complicated to calculate and we therefore settle for a more tractable notion; the point
is that the fit of a complete macro-history is simply not defined because the relevant
conditional probabilities do not exist.
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widely different results. These would be useful only if it was the case that
the fit rankings came out the same no matter the choice of instants. There
is at least a question whether this is the case.
4.4 The Putative Best System Is Not the Best System
I now assume, for the sake of argument, that the use of a DMH to calculate
fit can be defended in one way or another. Then a further problem emerges:
the package consisting of Hamiltonian Mechanics, PH and PHSP in fact is
not the best system. The reason for this is that we can always improve the fit
of a system if we choose a measure that, rather than being uniform over ΓMp ,
is somehow peaked over those initial conditions that are compatible with the
entire DMH.
Let us make this more precise. As above, I first use Loewer’s scheme and
then discuss how conditionalising a` la Albert would change matters. The
probability of the DMH is p(DMH) = pτ0(Aτ0|Qτ0) ... pτj−1(Aτj−1 |Qτj−1),
where the Aτi are those subsets of Mτi that evolve into Mτi+1 under the
evolution of the system between τi and τi+1. One can then prove that
p(DMH) = µ0[Γp ∩ φτ0−τ1(Γ1) ∩ ... ∩ φτ0−τj(Γj)] (10)
where Γp := ΓMp and Γi := ΓMτi for i = 1, ..., j. Now define N := Γp ∩
φτ0−τ1(Γ1) ... φτ0−τj(Γj). The fit of system is measured by the probability
that it assigns to the actual DMH, which is given by Equation (10). It is
a straightforward consequence of this equation that the fit of a system can
be improved by replacing µ0 by a measure µP that is peaked over N , i.e.
µP (N) > µ0(N) and µP (Γp \ N) < µ0(Γp \ N) while µP (Γp) = µ0(Γp). Fit
becomes maximal (i.e. p(DMH) = 1) if, for instance, we choose the measure
µN that assigns all the weight to N and none to Γp\N : µN(A) := kµ0(A∩N),
for all sets A ⊆ Γp and k = 1/µ0(N) (provided that µ0(N) 6= 0). Trivially,
N contains the actual initial condition of the unverse. A simpler and more
convenient distributions that yields maximal fit is a Dirac delta function over
the actual initial condition.
If there is such a simple way to improve (and even maximise) fit, why
does the demon not provide us with a system comprising µN or a delta func-
tion? Coming up with such a system is not a problem for the demon, as, by
assumption, he knows the entire Humean mosaic, which contains the exact
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initial condition. One reason to prefer µ0 to other measures might be that
these make the system less simple and that this loss in simplicity is not com-
pensated by a corresponding gain in fit and strength. This seems implausible.
Handling µN or a dirac delta function rather than µ0 does not render the
system much more complicated while the gain in fit is considerable. Hence
simplicity does not seem to provide reason to prefer µ0 to other measures
that have better fit.
To this one might reply that the gain in fit is not, as the above argu-
ment assumes, considerable.15 In fact, so the argument goes, the system
has already extremely good fit and fiddling around with the measure would
result at best in a small improvement of fit; and this small improvement
is not enough to compensate the loss in simplicity. Therefore, the system
containing µ0 is the best system after all.
This reply draws our attention to an important point, namely the ab-
sence of a specification in the putative best system of the Hamiltonian of the
universe.16 Assume that the macro history of the universe is indeed TD-like
in that the entropy increases most of the time. Why then should we assume
that the system consisting of Hamiltonian mechanics, PH and either PHSP
or LSP has good fit? Whether or not this is the case depends on the dy-
namical properties of the Hamiltonian of the system. The phase flow φ –
the solution of the equations of motion – explicitly occurs both in Equations
(7) and (8) and hence whether these probabilities come out such that the
the system has good fit with the actual history depends on the properties of
φ. In fact, we cannot calculate any probabilities at all if we don’t have φ!
Without a phase flow both PHSP and LSP remain silent and it is absolutely
essential that we are told what φ to plug into the probabilistic algorithms if
we want to obtain any results at all. So it is somewhat puzzling that Loewer
does not say anything about φ at all and Albert (2000, 96) completely passes
15Thanks to Eric Winsberg for a helpful discussion on this issue.
16Albert and Loewer regard Newtonian rather than Hamiltonian mechanics as part of
the best system. Newtonian mechanics has a wider scope that Hamiltonian mechanics in
that it allows also for dissipative force functions. However, such force functions do not
occur in SM, where forces are assumed to be conservative. But the motions to which
such forces give rise are more elegantly described by Hamilton mechanics. Hence I keep
talking about Hamiltonian mechanics in what follows, which is not a drawback because
the problems I describe would only be aggravated by considering full-fledged Newtonian
mechanics.
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over it in his definitive statement of his view (he says something about it at
another place; I come back to this below).
We are now faced with the situation that we have to plug some φ into to
either PHSP or LSP in order to make predictions, and at the same time we
are not told anything about which φ to take. One way out of this predicament
would be to assume that any φ would do. That is, the claim would be that
every classical system with PH and either PHSP or LSP behaves in such
a way that the actual history comes out having high fit. This, however, is
wrong. Whether a system behaves in this way, and whether the system has
good fit with the actual history of the world, essentially depends both on
the dynamics of the system and the structure of the macro-regions. Some
Hamiltonians don’t give rise to an approach to equilibrium at all (e.g. a
system of harmonic oscillators), and others may have constants of motion
whose invariant surfaces prevent the system from moving into certain regions
of phase space into which it would have to move for the macro-history to be
what it is.
Hence, the best system cannot possibly consist only of the above three
elements; it also has to contain a specification of the macro-state structure
and a Hamiltionian (from which we obtain φ by solving the equations of
motion). If we assume the macro-state structure to be given by the combi-
natorial argument, then the challenge is to present a Hamiltonian (or a class
of Hamiltonians) for which the fit of the system is high. How would such
Hamiltonian look like?
Two criteria emerge from Albert’s discussion. The first and obvious con-
dition is that φ must be such that the probabilities calculated using PHSP
come out hight. The second, somewhat more involved, requirement is that φ
be such that ‘abnormal’ microstates (i.e. ones that lead to un-thermodynamic
behaviour) are scattered in tiny clusters all over the macro-regions (2000, 67,
81-85). The motivation for this condition is subtle and need not occupy us
here; a detailed discussion can be found in Winsberg (2004a). Two things
about these conditions are remarkable. First, Albert’s discussion of these
conditions suggest that they are technicalities that at some point have to be
stated for completeness’ sake and then can be put aside; in other words, his
discussion suggests (although he does not say this explicitly) that these are
simple conditions that hold true in all classical systems and once this fact is
noticed we do not have to worry about them any more. This might explain
why neither of them is mentioned in the final statement of his view (2000,
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96). This is misleading. These conditions are extremely special and many
phase flows do not satisfy them. So it is very much an open question whether
the Hamiltonians of those systems – in particular the universe as a whole –
to which SM reasoning is applied satisfy these requirements.
To this one might reply that there is a sort of a transcendental argument
for the conclusion that the Hamiltonian of the universe indeed must belong
to this class of Hamiltonians, because if it did not then the universe simply
would not be what it is and thermodynamics would not be true in it. The
problem, and this is the second point, with this suggestion is that even if
this argument was sound, it would not solve the original problem, namely
that we cannot calculate any probabilities at all if we don’t have φ. The fact
that the Hamiltonian of the universe satisfies all required criteria does not
tell us what this Hamiltonian – or the phase flow φ associated with it – is,
and as long as we don’t have the Hamiltonian we simply cannot use either
PHSP or LSP. Hence a system that does not contain the Hamiltonian of the
universe is not really a system at because the probabilistic algorithms require
the phase flow φ of the universe to be given.
As it stands we don’t know what φ is and hence the package of classical
meachanics, PH and either PHSP or LSP fails to produce any predictions
at all. But assume now, again for the sake of argument, that we somehow
manage to get hold of the Hamiltonian (and can also solve the equations of
motion so that we obtain φ). We could then say that the best system consists
of Hamiltonian mechanics including the Hamiltonian of the universe, PH, the
mocrostate structure given by the combinatorial argument and a probabilistic
algorithm. Before we can make this suggestion definitive we need to settle the
question of which probabilistic algorithm to include. PHSP or LSP? There
is again a trade-off between simplicity and fit. On the one hand, PHSP is
simpler than LSP because conditionalising on just the past state is simpler
than conditionalising on the entire discrete macro history up to time t. On
the other hand, LSP will generally yield better predictions than PHSP and
hence make the system stronger. Whether on balance PHSP or LSP is the
better choice depends, again, on φ. It might be that the dynamics is so
friendly that Rt and Qt coincide, in which case PHSP is preferable on the
grounds of simplicity. If this is not the case, then LSP may well be the better
choice. Depending which one comes out as striking the better balance, we
add either PHSP or LSP to the above list. This then is our putative system.
Before raising a more fundamental objection against the view that the
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above quintet is a best system in the relevant sense, let me voice some scepti-
cism about this line of defence against the original charge that fit can always
be improved by substituting µ0 by a measure like µN . The past state is de-
fined solely via the value of some relevant macro parameters and the corre-
sponding macro-region, ΓMp , consists of all micro-states that are compatible
with these values. In particular no facts about the behaviour of the x ∈ ΓMp
under the time evolution of the system is made. Now it would be something
of a miracle if the overwhelming majority points (relative to the Lebesgue
measure) in a set thus defined would be the initial conditions of trajectories
that are compatible with the actual course of history. We would have to have
a very good and very special reason to assume that this is the case, and so
far we do not have such a reason. And I doubt that there there are. For
the approach to equilibrium to take place the system needs to be chaotic in
some way17, and such system involve divergence of nearby trajectories. For
this reason it is plausible to assume that different x in ∈ ΓMp evolve into
very different parts of phase space and thereby move through very different
macro-regions, and hence give rise to different macro-histories. And for this
reason using µN rather than µ0 would improve fit.
There is a more fundamental objection to the view that the quintet
of Hamiltonian mechanics, PH, the combinatorial mocrostate structure, a
Hamiltonian satisfying some relevant condition and, say, LSP is a best sys-
tem in Lewis’ sense. The point is that a system that does not contain proba-
bilities at all is much simpler than one that does, at least if probabilities are
introduced either by PHSP or LSP. The laws are made by Lewis’ demon and
in the deterministic world of classical mechanics, the simplest system that
the demon can come up with is one that consists of Hamilton’s equations
together with the Hamiltonian of the system, the macro-state structure, and
the exact initial condition – everything else follows from this. In other words,
simply adding the true initial condition as an axiom to mechanics and the
macro-state structure is much simpler than adding probabilities via either
PHSP or SPP – and doing this is no problem for the demon as he knows the
exact initial condition.
Before arguing for this let me locate the moot point. It is important
to be clear on the fact that the ability to solve equations is irrelevant to
17In what way is not an easy question and no satisfactory answer has been given to
date. For a discussion of this issue see Frigg (2007b).
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the argument, because both PHSP and LSP presuppose a solution to the
equations of motion, because the phase flow φ, which is the solution of he
equations of motion, explicitly figures both in Equations (7) and (8).18 In
this respect systems comprising PHSP or LSP are not simpler than the a
system containing the exact initial condition as an axiom. So the controversy
must be over the computational costs of handling initial conditions. The
argument, then, must go something like this: having the laws and relevant
macro information is much simpler than knowing an initial condition, because
storing an initial condition involves storing about 6n real numbers, which is
costly because one has to take it in (presumably feed it into a computer),
store it, and later on process it, which takes time and storage space and hence
comes at a high cost of simplicity.
This is an illusion, which stems from the ambiguous use of ‘macro infor-
mation’. Macro information – knowledge about the values of macroscopic
parameters such as pressure and volume – about the past state is useless
when we want to apply, say, PHSP. What goes into this probabilistic algo-
rithm is not macro information per se; it is the set of micro-states compatible
with the available macro information. Once this is realised, the apparent ad-
vantage of a system containing probabilities evaporates because taking in
and storing information about an entire set is more costly than taking in
and storing a single point. This is because specifying a set in 6n dimensional
space at least implies specifying its boundary, and this amounts to speci-
fying a 6n − 1 dimensional hypersurface, containing infinitely many points.
And when applying PHSP we have evolve forward in time this entire surface,
which involves evolving forward in time infinitely many points. How could
that possibly be simpler than taking in, storing, and evolving forward one
single point?
In sum, there are strong prima facie reasons to assume that the system’s
fit can be improved by changing the initial measure. And even should it turn
out that this is not the case, a system without probabilities would be better
than one with probabilities. Therefore, neither PHSP nor LSP probabilities
can be interpreted as Humean chances.
18Notice that this is a very strong, and entirely unrealistic, assumption. Characteristi-
cally we do not have solutions to the equations of motion of systems studied in SM, and
many physicist see this as the motivation to use statistical considerations to begin with
(see for instance Khinchin 1949).
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4.5 Epistemic Probabilities After All
Where does this leave us? I think that the above considerations make it
plausible that what ultimately give rise to the introduction of probabilities
into classical mechanics are the epistemic limitations of those who use the
theory. All we can know about a system is its macro-state and hence we
put a probability distribution over the micro-states compatible with that
macro-state, which then reflects our lack of knowledge.
How these epistemic probabilities should be understood is a question that
needs to be further discussed. Here I can only hint at two possibilities. The
first, a version of objective Bayesianism, appeals to Jayenes’ maximum en-
tropy principle, which indeed instructs us to prefer µ0 to alternative measures
because, given the information about the system’s macro state, µ0 maximises
the (continuous) Shannon entropy. The other alternative is to revise Lewis’
account in way that builds epistemic restrictions of the users of theories into
the selection criteria for systems. This is possible, for instance, by making
epistemic facts a part of the Humean mosaic and then set the demon the
task to come up with the best system taking into account not only physical
but also epistemic facts. Hoefer’s (2007) theory of Humean chance seems
to make room for this possibility. This option should not scandalise that
Humean. The bedrock of contemporary Humeanism as regards probability
is the rejection of a metaphysical grounding of probabilities in propensities,
tendencies, dispositions, or the like. At the same time the Humean regards
probabilities as linked to human beliefs by the so-called Principal Principle,
roughly the proposition that our subjective probabilities for an event to hap-
pen should match what we take to be its objective chance. Hence, for the
Humean probabilities are both non-metaphysical and closely linked to beliefs.
What distinguishes the Humean from the subjective Bayesian is the ques-
tion of how the values of the probabilities are determined. For the subjective
Bayesian individual beliefs and the consistency requirement are all that there
is to probability; the Humean, by contrast, thinks that the probability of an
event is determined by the structure of the world, by what the facts are, and
not by what some agent happens to believe. Hence, per se, the fact that SM
probabilities are epistemic probabilities is no reason for outrage; the crucial
question is whether we can regard the probability distribution assumed in
SM as determined by facts about the world rather than by some particular
agent’s whim, and if there are facts about what agents can and cannot know,
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this seems to be at least a distinct possibility.
There are two main complaints about an epistemic interpretation of SM
probabilities. The first19 points out that the thermodynamic entropy is a
property of a physical system and that SB coincides with it up to a constant.
This, so the argument goes, is inexplicable on the basis of an epistemic ap-
proach to probabilities. This argument has indeed some force when put
forward against the Gibbs entropy if the SM probabilities are given an ig-
norance interpretation, because the Gibbs entropy is defined in terms of the
probability distribution of the system. However, it has no force against an
epistemic interpretation of PHSP or LSP probabilities simply because these
probabilities do not occur in the Boltzmann entropy, which is defined in
terms of the measure of certain chunks of phase space (see Equation (2)).
Probabilities have simply nothing to with it.
Another frequently heard objection is a complaint about the alleged
causal efficacy of human knowledge. The point becomes clear in the fol-
lowing – rhetorical – questions by Albert:20
‘Can anybody seriously think that it is somehow necessary, that it
is somehow a priori, that the particles that make up the material
world must arrange themselves in accord with what we know, with
what we happen to have looked into? Can anybody seriously think
that our merely being ignorant of the exact microconditions of
thermodynamic systems plays some part in bringing it about, in
making it the case, that (say) milk dissolves in coffee? How could
that be?’ (Albert 2000, 64, original emphasis)21
It can’t be, and no one should think that it could. Proponents of epis-
temic probabilities need not believe in parapsychology, and therewith regard
knowledge of tea and coffee as causally relevant to their cooling down.
19This point is often made in conversation, but I have been unable to locate it in print.
20Redhead (1995, 27-28, 32-33), Loewer (2001, 611), Goldstein (2001, 48), and Meacham
(2005 287-8) essentially the same point.
21This contrasts starkly with the epistemic language that Albert uses throughout his
discussion of PHSP. In the passages quoted above, for instance, he defines the Past State as
the one with which the ‘normal inferential procedures of cosmology will eventually present
us’ and when discussing conditionalising on PH he names ‘make inferences about the
world’ as the aim and invites us to put a measure over those regions that are compatible
with ‘whatever it is that we happen to know about the present physical condition of the
universe’.
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What underlies this objection is the mistaken view that PHSP probabili-
ties play a part in bringing about things in the world. Of course the cooling
down of drinks and the boiling of kettles has nothing to do with what any-
body thinks or knows about them; but they have nothing to do with the
probabilities attached to these events either. Drinks cool down and kettles
boil because the universe’s initial condition is such that under the dynamics
of the system it evolves into a state in which this happens. There is no causal
connection between knowledge and happenings in the world, and, at least in
the context of classical SM, nothing of that sort is suggested by an epistemic
interpretation of probabilities.
We have now reached the same point as in the discussion of macro-
probabilities in the last section. All that is needed to explain why things
happen is the initial condition and the dynamics. Prima facie appearances
notwithstanding, neither PHSP nor LSP probabilities have any role to play
in explaining why a system behaves as it does. If these probabilities come
out as BL would have them, this is indicative, it is a symptom, of the system
behaving ‘thermodynamically’, but it is not the cause for this behaviour.
5 Conclusion
I have discussed two different ways of introducing probabilities into BSM
and argued that the first one is irredeemably flawed, while the second leads
to probabilities that are best understood as epistemic probabilities. The
discussion of both approaches have shown that there is big ‘blind spot’ in the
litarature on BSM, namely dynamics. Too much emphasis has been placed
on probabilities and not enough attention has been paid to the dynamical
conditions that have to fall in place for a system to behave TD-like. This
puts two items on the agenda of future discussions of BSM: we need to
understand better the nature of the epistemic probabilities used in SM an we
need to study more carefully the role that the dynamics of the system plays
in explaining TD-like behaviour.
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